garnett observes that William claimed england as the direct successor of the Confessor, on the understanding that edward had bequeathed it to him, in the manner of a parcel of land; he then made good this hereditary right at the moment of his coronation and anointing. But neither part of this process conformed to pre-Conquest english practice. english kings were recognised as such before their coronations; the ritual did not create the king. And the Anglo-saxon kingdom was never the king's property, to dispose of entirely as he would; while the king possessed some significant control over the distribution of estates held ex officio, apparently changing the holders of earldoms at will,2 he nevertheless made no assertion of ownership over all the land of england. Thus despite his claim to continue the old english line, William transformed english kingship, creating a unique and anomalous situation of great royal power; but also of instability. An inherent weakness lay in the combination of the two claims: for if all tenure was stated to be derived from the king, and yet a successor only became king at the moment of coronation and anointing, then the period of interregnum between a king's death and the new king's coronation carried explosive legal implications. What happens to tenure when there is no king? garnett argues that this legal crisis created the conditions by which a royal succession conflict would be transmitted and multiplied throughout aristocratic society, as each landholder sought to confirm and renew his rights. Contemporary chroniclers such as eadmer, in attempting to explain this matter, believed that the situation must have arisen from the importation of usual practice in normandy. But in this assumption garnett demonstrates that eadmer was wrong; it was in the unique, sui generis circumstances of the justification of William's seizure of england that this anomalous kingship was forged.
The full implications of this argument are in dispute; susan reynolds has noted simply that there is not sufficient evidence to support the notion that the king actually owned all the land of the kingdom, in a fully practical and legal sense;3 and there is undoubtedly a chaotic and ad hoc character to the politics of the period, which makes the distillation of tenurial theory an uncertain business.4 Perhaps the most serious difficulty with the thesis, in fact, is this attention solely to legal theory, removed both from the pragmatics of political behaviour, and from the numerous other
